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Abstract—Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) allows the data owner to outsource an encrypted database to a remote server in a
private manner while maintaining the ability for selectively search. So far, most existing solutions focus on an honest-but-curious server,
while security designs against a malicious server have not drawn enough attention. A few recent works have attempted to construct
verifiable SSE that enables the data owner to verify the integrity of search results. Nevertheless, these verification mechanisms are
highly dependent on specific SSE schemes, and fail to support complex queries. A general verification mechanism is desired that can
be applied to all SSE schemes. In this work, instead of concentrating on a central server, we explore the potential of the smart contract,
an emerging blockchain-based decentralized technology, and construct decentralized SSE schemes where the data owner can receive
correct search results with assurance without worrying about potential wrongdoings of a malicious server. We study both public and
private blockchain environments and propose two designs with a trade-off between security and efficiency. To better support practical
applications, the multi-user setting of SSE is further investigated where the data owner allows authenticated users to search keywords
in shared documents. We implement prototypes of our two designs and present experiments and evaluations to demonstrate the
practicability of our decentralized SSE schemes.
Index Terms—Searchable symmetric encryption, blockchain, decentralization.
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1 INTRODUCTION
S EARCHABLE symmetric encryption (SSE) has been ex-tensively studied for a long time since it was first intro-
duced in [6]. Generally, it allows a data owner to outsource
data to an untrusted server in the encrypted form and
later search for the records matching a given query. During
the entire search process, the private information about the
database and the query is well protected from the semi-
trusted server.
In most existing works, the remote server is modeled
as an honest-but-curious entity [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15] who never tries to deviate from the prescribed
protocol. In reality, however, a malicious server may return
partial answers or even non-matching documents (e.g., due
to random failures). More seriously, any security breach
and insider attacker may illegally gain access to alter the
computations performed over the data. This could happen
when a successful malware infection (e.g., email attach-
ments, infected P2P media) on one host gives an attacker
a high access authority. To address these concerns, security
designs against a malicious server are urgently needed to
facilitate the wide application of SSE.
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Recently, a few works have been devoted to designing
verifiable SSE schemes where a data owner is able to verify
the integrity of search results. Nevertheless, their verifica-
tion techniques (e.g., using MAC [3] or hash table [5]) are
highly dependent on specific SSE schemes, and for now only
support simple query expressions such as single-keyword
search. How to generically impose verifiability on the exist-
ing abundant SSE schemes that support expressive queries
and complex data structures (e.g., boolen query [16], [17] or
graph data [18]) without incurring expensive overheads on
the data owner remains unclear.
We observe that the main reason of possible cheating
is that the centralized server takes full control of data
and executes protocols independently without being super-
vised. In light of this, we resort to smart contract, a newly
emerging decentralized computing paradigm in blockchain
where all operations are transparent and reliable. Getting
rid of a central server, outsourcing search queries to smart
contract yields a correct and immutable result, and requires
no further verifications by the data owner. It thoroughly
eliminates our misgivings about a malicious adversary as
long as the security of blockchain is guaranteed.
To this end, we first study public blockchain, a permis-
sionless environment that everyone can get access to. It
provides an off-the-shelf decentralized platform, enabling
the data owner to directly make use of it. By utilizing
the popular public blockchain environment Ethereum [19],
we, for the first time, propose a decentralized SSE scheme
Π. The smart contract running over Ethereum is carefully
designed to circumvent various barriers (e.g., gas limitation,
gas availability) in Ethereum. Considering some application
scenarios where a set of permissioned service providers (i.e.,
peer nodes) is available, we further study private blockchain
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2Scheme Search Update Decentralized Soundness StatelessTime Commu. Time Commu.
Previous Works
CJJ’14 [2] O(dw) O(tw) O(|Wid|) O(|Wid|) 7 7 7
SPS’14 [3] O(min{dw + logN, tw log3N}) O(tw + logN) O(log2N) O(logN) 7 3 7
BFP’16 [4] O(dw + logm) O(tw + logm) O(logm) O(logm) 7 3 7
B’16 [5] O(dw) O(tw) O(|Wid|) O(|Wid|) 7 3 7
This Work
Π O(dw) O(tw) O(|Wid|) O(|Wid|) 3 3 3
Π+ O(dw) O(tw) O(|Wid|) O(|Wid|) 3 3 3
TABLE 1: Comparison with existing SSE schemes. Complexities of time and communication costs are presented. N is the
total number of keyword/document pairs. m is the number of distinct keywords. dw is the number of times that the
keyword w is historically added to the database. tw is the size of returned search result set. |Wid| denotes the number of
distinct keywords for a given file identifier id. Each update is evaluated by adding/deleting a file. We focus on the schemes
that are secure against a malicious adversary (i.e., preserving soundness) here.
environment running among those service providers, and
propose an alternative decentralized SSE scheme Π+ lever-
aging the popular private blockchain framework Hyper-
ledger [20]. The two proposed designs Π and Π+ have their
own merits, leading to a trade-off between security and
efficiency. To give an exemplary instantiation, both Π and
Π+ are constructed on classic inverted index based search-
able symmetric encryption schemes [2], [5]. We emphasize
that our framework is a general one, and many other SSE
solutions supporting complex expressiveness (e.g., boolean
queries) and structured data (e.g., graph) fit for our setting as
well and can be altered likewise to have their decentralized
counterparts, as explicitly discussed in Section 9.
In order to further support practical applications, we
investigate the multi-user setting, a more complex scenario
of SSE [8], [9], [21] where an authorized user is allowed
to search files shared by the data owner. For instance, in a
traditional cloud-based picture or file sharing system (e.g.,
Dropbox), a data owner can upload its pictures or files
to the cloud server such that they can be shared among
friends or family. In our decentralized setting, instead of
using the cloud server, we also aim to provide sharing
services through the blockchain network. We study public
and private blockchain environments and show how to
enable users to search private database, and impose search
control such as adding or revoking users. According to
the characteristics of the underlying blockchain platforms,
we use a straightforward extension for Π: letting the data
owner search after receiving the user’s query. For the private
blockchain scheme Π+, we propose an alternative approach
that enables the user to search keywords independently and
efficiently without getting any help from the data owner.
In summary, we make the following key contributions:
• By leveraging the smart contract, we propose two
decentralized searchable symmetric encryption (SSE)
schemes Π and Π+, catering to the public and the
private blockchain environments respectively, to guar-
antee that the data owner receives correct search results
and has no need to perform verifications in the face of
a malicious adversary.
• We investigate the multi-user setting for both Π and Π+
where the authorized users are able to search shared
files correctly and privately, and the data owner can
add/revoke users flexibly.
• We implement two prototypes of Π and Π+. Extensive
experiments and evaluations over local simulated net-
work and official test network demonstrate the prac-
ticability of designing SSE schemes in a decentralized
manner.
2 RELATED WORK
Searchable Symmetric Encryption. SSE was first intro-
duced in [6]. Since then, great efforts have been devoted to
developing secure and efficient SSE schemes. More than ten
years ago, [9] for the first time formally considered leakage
and designed a static SSE scheme that is secure against
adaptive chosen-keyword attack. As a following work, [7]
proposed the first dynamic SSE scheme that is also secure
against adaptive chosen-keyword attack.
In recent years, most of SSE works focus on supporting
more complex structures and queries and improving effi-
ciency with regard to search time and communication cost.
One of the most notable examples is [16] that proposed the
first SSE scheme to support conjunctive queries in sub-linear
time. Then [17] extended this work to achieve much more
complex queries including substring, range, wildcard and
phrase queries. Besides, [12], [13] showed how to handle
boolean formulas, ranges and stemming by using garbled
circuits and bloom filters. [2] then proposed several opti-
mizations to handle very-large datasets (e.g., tens of billions
of record-keyword pairs). Recently, [11] proposed the first
efficient disjunctive and boolean SSE scheme with the worst-
case sub-linear search complexity and optimal communi-
cation overhead. Along another line, [22] extended SSE to
support arbitrarily-structured data, such as graphs, labeled
data or matrices. And a recent work [18] presented a graph
encryption scheme to support approximate shortest distance
queries. All of these works, however, address the security
against a semi-honest adversary. They are vulnerable to a
malicious server who may return incorrect search results.
Verifiable Searchable Symmetric Encryption. To mit-
igate a malicious adversary, verifiable SSE schemes have
aroused interests in recent years. [23] studied this prob-
lem and proposed a verifiable SSE scheme that is UC-
secure. Then [3], [4] constructed dynamic and more efficient
schemes. Based on these results, recently [5] used trapdoor
permutations to construct a very simple forward secure
searchable encryption scheme. To address the limitations
of demanding specific SSE constructions, [24] proposed a
3generic verifiable scheme by using Merkle Patricia Tree
(MPT) and Incremental Hash to create the proof index.
Nevertheless, these works have to impose extra computa-
tion cost and storage overhead on a stateful data owner.
Our preliminary work [1] proposed utilizing smart con-
tracts in Ethereum to realize a decentralized and reliable
SSE scheme, but it suffers from high overheads (e.g., gas
and cryptocurrency consumptions, time costs) due to some
inherent characteristics of public blockchains (e.g., PoW-
based mining process), and does not fully consider the
multi-user setting where adding/revoking users should be
supported. We therefore propose a new scheme Π+ by
making use of private blockchain to improve efficiency. We
further investigate the multi-user setting for Π+, and show
how to enable authorized users to search private database.
We propose new secure protocols to flexibly add and revoke
users. Moreover, several construction variants are proposed
to address some security issues and strengthen our designs.
Table 1 gives a comparison of our work and previous
verifiable SSE schemes.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide some basic introductions on
traditional searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) and the
cryptographic tools we will use, and main technologies that
support our decentralized design, namely smart contracts in
Ethereum and Hyperledger.
3.1 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
We follow the formalization of Kamara et al. [7] with a
slight modification. In our paper, λ is defined as the security
parameter and negl(λ) denotes a negligible function in the
security parameter. The set of all binary strings of length λ
is denoted as {0, 1}λ, and the set of all finite binary strings is
denoted as {0, 1}∗. We write x $←− X to represent an element
being sampled uniformly at random from a finite set X . The
algorithms and protocols are running in polynomial time. In
particular, adversaries are polynomial-time algorithms.
A database DB = (idi,Wi)di=1 is a list of
identifier/keyword-set pairs where idi ∈ {0, 1}l and Wi ⊆
{0, 1}∗. The set of keywords of the database DB is W =
∪di=1Wi. The set of documents containing a given keyword
w ∈ W is denoted as DB(w) = {idi|w ∈ Wi}. We will
always set m = |W| and N = ∑w∈W |DB(w)| to be the
number of distinct keywords and the total number of key-
word/document pairs, respectively.
A traditional dynamic searchable symmetric encryption
scheme Π consists of one algorithm Setup and two protocols
Search and Update between a data owner and a server.
• Setup(DB) takes as input a database DB and outputs a
tuple (EDB,K, δ) where EDB is the encrypted database,
K is a secret key, and δ is the data owner’s state.
• Search(K, δ, w; EDB) is an interactive protocol where
the data owner takes as input the secret key K , its
state δ, and a search word w ∈ {0, 1}∗, and the server
takes as input the encrypted database EDB. The server
outputs a set of identifiers while the data owner has no
output.
• Update(K, δ, op, id,Wid; EDB) is an interactive protocol
between the data owner with inputs the key K , the
state δ, an operation op ∈ {add, del}, a file identifier
id, and a set Wid of distinct keywords, and the server
with input EDB. These inputs represent the actions of
adding a new file with identifier id and deleting the file
with identifier id.
For simplicity, the formalization of SSE here does not
model the storage of the actual document payloads. The
SSE literature varies on dealing with this issue. In our
case where decentralized environment is considered, we can
store encrypted documents in any decentralized file systems
such as IPFS discussed below.
Cryptographic Tools. In our constructions, we make use
of variable-input-length pseudo-random functions (PRFs)
which are polynomial-time computable functions that can-
not be distinguished from random functions by any prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary. Formal definitions of
PRFs can be found in [25]. Some of our constructions will
be analyzed in the random oracle model [26]. We use H to
denote the random oracle.
3.2 Gas System in Ethereum
Gas system is a fantastic feature in Ethereum. It is designed
to mitigate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on the Ethereum
network. Specifically, the contract script is compiled into
Ethereum opcodes and stored in the blockchain. Each op-
code will cost a certain pre-defined amount of gas [19]. When
initiating a smart contract through sending a transaction, the
sender has to specify the available gasLimit that supports for
execution, and the corresponding gasPrice that the sender
is willing to pay for each unit of gas. The transaction will
get included in the blockchain successfully only when the
balance of the sender is larger than gasLimit × gasPrice.
Although useful in avoiding network abuse, however, the
gas system also sets some restrictions in designing our
schemes as described in Section 5.
3.3 Smart Contract in Ethereum
Ethereum is a new promising public blockchain plat-
form [19]. Its security is maintained by a cryptographic
chain of puzzles (or blocks). Miners in the Ethereum net-
work validate and approve transactions while mining new
blocks. Mining a new block by successfully solving a
designated cryptographic puzzle rewards the miners with
newly-created cryptocurrency and thus incentivizes them
to mine more blocks, i.e., Proof-of-Work (PoW). The cor-
rectness of the network is guaranteed by this incentive
mechanism. Anyone at any given point of time can join or
leave/read/write/audit the public blockchain. In general,
Ethereum provides us with two appealing properties:
• Consensus. The entire network agrees on the rules to
verify each transaction and block. The data stored and
computations executed on Ethereum must be consistent
across miners and cannot be modified or denied.
• Transparency. Ethereum is a public network. All the
stored data and executed computations are transparent
to any users.
Therefore, Ethereum acts as a trusted base who is trusted for
correctness and availability, but not for privacy.
4Smart contracts in Ethereum are applications with a
state stored in the blockchain. They can facilitate, verify, and
enforce the process of a contract. Each smart contract, iden-
tified by a special address, consists of script code, a currency
balance, and storage space in the form of a key/value store.
Once created and deployed to Ethereum, the contract’s code
cannot be modified forever even for its creator.1 The contract
can be triggered by a transaction from an external account
or a call from other contracts, and is executed in transaction
form. Once a smart contract transaction gets included in
the blockchain, all the nodes in the network are expected
to verify its validity by repeating the contract script. The
most distinguished feature of smart contract in Ethereum
lies in its support for Turing-complete scripting, which makes
it feasible for us to design various complex functions.
3.4 Smart Contract in Hyperledger
Hyperledger is a modular and extensible open-source sys-
tem for deploying and operating private (or consortium)
blockchains [20]. It is a typical kind of permissioned
blockchain, running among a set of known and identified
participants who share a common goal but do not fully
trust each other. Usually the consensus is guaranteed using
traditional protocols like PBFT [27].
Smart contracts in Hyperledger, also called chaincodes,
are supported to implement the application logic written
in general-purpose programming languages (e.g., Go, Java,
Node.js). The execution of smart contracts in Hyperledger
is different from that in Ethereum. In Hyperledger, instead
of following the order-execute architecture, a new execute-
order-validate architecture is realized to improve system
efficiency and stability. Such design enables us to deploy a
more efficient application. More importantly, no cryptocur-
rency is needed to support the execution of smart contracts.
4 SECURITY DEFINITIONS
In this section, we explicitly discuss the security goals our
design aims to achieve.
Soundness. This property is derived from [4] which
basically indicates that the server will get caught if it tries
to deviate from the protocol. In other words, the data owner
(and other users) will not accept a wrong search result.
Usually existing works achieve this objective by letting the
data owner conduct a series of verifications. In this paper,
we extend this notion to claim that the received search
results are reliable and correct definitely, and no verification
is needed on the data owner.
Confidentiality. The confidentiality of SSE evaluates the
private information protected from the adversary. It fol-
lows the real/ideal simulation paradigm [2], [7], [9] and is
parametrized by three leakage functions L = (L1,L2,L3) that
describe what is allowed to leak to the adversary and are
formalized as stateful algorithms. Formally, we have,
Definition: Let Π = (Setup,Search,Update) be a dynamic
SSE scheme and consider the following experiments with
a stateful adversary A, a stateful simulator S and three
stateful leakage functions L = (L1, L2, L3):
1. Except for that a special suicide opcode that clears all of the
contract’s data is used.
RealΠA(λ) : A chooses DB. The challenger runs Setup(DB)
to generate the key K and gives EDB to A. Then A
repeatedly makes Search and Update queries where A
chooses challenger’s input in. Meanwhile, the experi-
ment runs Search or Update with challenger’s input
(K, in) and A’s input EDB, and gives the transcript
to A. Finally, A returns a bit b as the output of the
experiment.
IdealΠA,S(λ) : A chooses DB. The simulator is given
L1(DB) and sends EDB to A. Then A repeatedly
makes Search and Update queries where A chooses
simulator’s input in. Meanwhile, the experiment runs
Search (resp. Update) with simulator input L2(in) (resp.
L3(in)) and gives the simulated transcript to A. Finally,
A returns a bit b as the output of the experiment.
We say that Π is L-secure against adaptive attacks if for
all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A, there
exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that
|Pr[RealΠA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealΠA,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
The L-secure against non-adaptive attacks can be defined
in the same way, except that in both experiments A must
choose all of its queries at the start, and L takes them all as
input and gives the output to S who generates EDB and the
transcripts at the same time.
5 DECENTRALIZED SSE IN PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN
We first construct a decentralized SSE scheme Π with off-
the-shelf public blockchains. To give an exemplary instanti-
ation, Π is adapted from existing pioneering inverted index
frameworks (such as [2], [5]) and modified to fit the decen-
tralized environment. Therefore, soundness is automatically
implied as long as the security of the underlying decentral-
ized platforms is guaranteed. In Section 9, we show that the
other SSE schemes with expressive queries or complex data
types can also be extended to our settings similarly.
5.1 Design Challenges and Countermeasures
Intuitively, any traditional SSE scheme can be directly
adapted to decentralized environment by replacing the cen-
tral server with the smart contract. Unfortunately, some
innovative features that guarantee the robustness and se-
curity of smart contract become obstacles instead in this
adaption. Next we present some main design challenges and
summarize the countermeasures at a high level.
Gas Limitation. In Ethereum, each transaction that calls
a function of the smart contract has a upper bound of
consumed gas, called gasLimit as described in Section 3.3.
Each operation, including sending/storing data and execut-
ing computations, has a fixed gas cost. This restricts the
designed function to have extremely limited computation
steps and storage. Therefore, to make SSE over a large
database become feasible, we are motivated to divide the
database into smaller ones and conquer them individually.
Simply speaking, in the setup phase where a large encrypted
index is built, we partition the encrypted index into several
blocks and upload them to the contract with sufficient
transactions such that each transaction consumes less gas
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Index
Fig. 1: A system overview for our scheme Π.
than gasLimit. To ensure correctness, the contract needs to
align the data together in order to return all matched results.
Gas Availability. In the smart contract, each transaction
is also associated with a gasPrice that specifies the money
the sender is willing to spend to purchase the gas. It is
required that the user who initiates the transaction has an
account balance larger than the gas cost for executing the
transaction. Otherwise the transaction will abort intermedi-
ately while the consumed gas cannot be refunded. Thus we
should be very careful with the contract design with regard
to gas cost. Particularly, it is critical to ensure that each
functionality (e.g., Search,Update) in the contract incurs
lower gas cost than the sender’s account balance.
The Verifier’s Dilemma. In Ethereum, miners are required
to check the validity of transactions. However, verifying
transactions may become significantly expensive when there
are abundant and complex expressions in smart contracts.
For rational miners, they are thus incentivized to skip the
verification of the expensive transactions so as to stay ahead
in the race to mine the next block. This phenomenon is
called the verifier’s dilemma [28]. To mitigate this attack, we
are motivated to reduce the computation burden on the
contract as much as possible. Our first observation is that the
smart contract supports dictionary data type, and the main
computation overhead of SSE lies in the search phase. In
light of this, we make use of a dictionary to store encrypted
index (i.e., EDB), which makes the search time complexity
beO(dw), where dw is the number of times that the keyword
w has been historically added to the database. Our second
optimization is the ultilization of packing method inspired
by [2]. Specifically, we can pack multiple plaintexts and en-
crypt the output to obtain one ciphertext with the same size.
The search result is thus in blocks instead of individuals.
Besides, packing also helps us circumvent the above Gas
Limitation since it greatly reduces the storage cost. We note
that although [2] claimed to use the packing method as well,
it didn’t describe how to implement it explicitly.
5.2 System Overview
In Fig. 1, we outline the architecture of our design.
Then the data owner builds an encrypted index of key-
word/identifier pairs and sends it to Ethereum, where
complex computations are available via the smart contract.
For ease of presentation, operations on the data documents
are not shown in the framework since the data owner could
easily employ the traditional symmetric key cryptography
to encrypt documents and then outsource encrypted data
to any decentralized file storage network like InterPlanetary
File System (IPFS). The reason why we don’t put encrypted
documents on Ethereum is that it is very expensive to store
data on it. Offloading huge data sets to another platform
while focusing on computation on Ethereum with small
data storage benefits the Ethereum network greatly with
regard to efficiency and robustness.
For each query, the data owner sends a transaction
containing the search token to the designated smart contract.
Note that each contract has a unique address in Ethereum.
With the search token and previously stored index, the
smart contract executes search algorithms and saves the
search results (i.e., file identifiers) to its state. The data
owner can later read the state and use file id to retrieve real
documents from file storage network. For adding or deleting
files, the data owner also only needs to send add/delete
tokens to the contract and wait for the transactions to be
mined into the block. For the add operation, our scheme
requires the data owner to maintain a dictionary locally. In
fact this is unnecessary and we could modify the scheme
slightly to make the data owner stateless as shown in
Section 8.
5.3 Our Detailed Construction
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we give a formal description of
our decentralized SSE scheme Π. For simplicity, let F :
{0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, G : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}∗
be two pseudo-random functions (Note that there should
be different PRFs for different input keys). We use || to
denote the concatenation operation. “b·c” is a floor function,
and “| · |” denotes the number of elements in a list. For
a dictionary data type, it includes two algorithms: Add and
Delete. And we use term Get to fetch the specified data item
in a dictionary. For example, given a dictionary data type γ
and an input label l, Get(γ, l) outputs the corresponding
item d||r and parses it into d and r.
In the Setup phase, the data owner divides DB(w)
into α + 1 blocks, with each block of p entries. Here p
is a system parameter chosen by the data owner. We use
concatenation to pack multiple file identifiers into one. To
ensure confidentiality, the bit length of i˜d should be less
than that of the security parameter λ. Therefore, we have
p ≤ λl , where l is the bit length of the file identifier. Note that
before uploading the database, the list L should be placed
in lexicographic order. Otherwise it will leak information
about the order in which the input was processed. To avoid
exceeding gasLimit, we partition the encrypted database
into n blocks and send them to the contract one by one
with n different transactions. At the contract side, they are
received iteratively and placed together using dictionary
data type. Similarly, the search process will be completed
with R transactions, each of which returns step items at
most. Here n, R and step are public system parameters and
experimentally determined.
In the Add phase, we encrypt file id without using
packing. This is because encrypting several plaintexts into
one ciphertext makes it hard for the contract to identify
which file/keyword pair has been previously deleted, i.e.,
whether it exists in the set IDdel. In addition, in reality
changes often happen with only one or several documents
at one time. Update incurs much less gas cost than the
Gas Limitation. Therefore, individually dealing with file id
satisfies the system requirements for update operations.
6Our scheme Π: Protocol on the data owner.
Setup(DB):
1) Initialize an empty list L, and an empty dictionary
σ; Sample three keys K,KA,KD $←− {0, 1}λ.
2) For each keyword w ∈ W:
a) K1 ← F (K, 1||w); K2 ← F (K, 2||w);
b) Set α ← b |DB(w)|p c, c ← 0, where p denotes the
number of identifiers that can be packed.
c) Divide DB(w) into α+1 blocks. Pad the last block
to p entries if needed.
d) For each block in DB(w):
- i˜d← id1||id2||...||idp; r $←− {0, 1}λ.
- d← i˜d⊕GK2(r); l← F (K1, c); c+ +.
- Add (l, d, r) to the list L in lex order.
3) Set EDB = L; Partition EDB into n blocks EDBi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and send them to the contract.
Search(K,KA,KD, w):
1) K1 ← F (K, 1||w), K2 ← F (K, 2||w).
2) KA1 ← F (KA, 1||w), KA2 ← F (KA, 2||w).
3) KD1 ← F (KD, w); c← 0; Estimate R and step.
4) For i = 0 to R:
a) Send search token ST =
(K1,K2,K
A
1 ,K
A
2 ,K
D
1 , c) to the contract.
b) c← c+ step.
Add(K,KA,KD, id,Wid) phase 1:
1) Initialize an empty list LA.
2) For each keyword w ∈ Wid:
a) K1 ← F (K, 1||w), K2 ← F (K, 2||w).
b) KA1 ← F (KA, 1||w), KA2 ← F (KA, 2||w).
c) KD1 ← F (KD, w); r $←− {0, 1}λ.
d) c← Get(σ,w); If c =⊥ then c← 0.
e) l← F (KA1 , c); d← id⊕GKA2 (r).
f) iddel ← F (KD1 , id).
g) Add (l, d, r, iddel) to L
A in lex order.
3) Send LA to the contract.
Add(K,KA,KD, id,Wid) phase 2:
1) Read re from the contract.
2) For i = 0 to |re|:
a) if re[i] = 0:
- Fetch the i-th keyword w in Wid.
- c← Get(σ,w); c++; Insert (w, c) into σ.
Delete(KD, id,Wid):
1) Initialize an empty list LD .
2) For each keyword w ∈ Wid:
a) KD1 ← F (KD, w), iddel ← F (KD1 , id).
b) Add iddel to LD in lex order.
3) Send LD to the contract.
Fig. 2: Our decentralized SSE scheme in Ethereum.
For the protocol on the smart contract, we remark that
transaction triggering functions in smart contract doesn’t
return any results. Execution of any function only changes
Our scheme Π: Protocol on the smart contract.
Setup(EDB1,EDB2, · · · ,EDBn):
1) Initialize two empty dictionaries γ and γA.
2) Initialize an empty list IDdel.
3) For each received EDBi:
a) Parse each entry in EDBi into (l, d, r).
b) Add each (l, d||r) to γ.
Search(K1,K2,KA1 ,K
A
2 ,K
D
1 , c):
1) Assert the estimated gas cost is lower than the
balance.
2) For i = 0 until Get returns ⊥ or i ≥ step:
a) l← F (K1, c); d, r ← Get(γ, l).
b) i˜d← d⊕GK2(r); c+ +; i+ +.
c) Parse i˜d into (id1, · · · , idp).
d) Assert idj /∈ IDdel (1 ≤ j ≤ p).
e) Save idj to the state.
3) Assert γA has not been searched.
4) For c = 0 until Get returns ⊥:
a) l← F (KA1 , c); d, r ← Get(γA, l).
b) id← d⊕GKA2 (r); c+ +.
c) Assert id /∈ IDdel.
d) Save id to the state.
Add(LA):
1) Initialize an empty list re of size |LA|.
2) Parse each tuple of LA into (l, d, r, iddel).
3) Set i← 0.
4) For each tuple in LA:
a) if iddel ∈ IDdel:
- re[i]← 1.
- Delete iddel from IDdel.
b) else:
- re[i]← 0.
- Add (l, d||r) to γA.
c) i+ +.
5) Save re to the state.
Delete(LD):
1) For each element iddel in L
D :
a) Add iddel to IDdel.
Fig. 3: Our decentralized SSE scheme in Ethereum.
its state that is permanently stored on Ethereum. We imple-
ment our scheme by saving search results into the state and
later reading them on the data owner side.
5.4 Multi-user Setting
In this work, we further address the issue of multi-user data
sharing as considered in [8], [9], [21]. In such applications,
the data owner is interested in allowing a third party (i.e.,
other users) to search the database, while the other users
learn the information that the data owner authorizes them
to learn but nothing else. The private information about
7① Keywords
②  Search 
Token
③ Search
Result
Data Owner User
Smart Contract
Fig. 4: System overview of multi-user setting in public
blockchain.
the queries and search results should be protected from the
adversary as well.
Using existing cryptographic tools such as broadcast
encryption [21] is a possible solution to help the data owner
add and revoke users. In a permissionless blockchain envi-
ronment like Ethereum, however, anyone at any time can
participate in the network and read/write history records,
and everything on the smart contract is public. It is not
applicable to leverage such cryptographic schemes which
usually require the nodes in the network to store a pri-
vate key and perform decryption operations. Currently
we propose to use the straightforward extension for Π as
indicated in [8]: the data owner receives the user’s query,
and generates the corresponding search tokens as if himself
is searching the database. Fig. 4 gives an overview for
the multi-user design. Relying on cryptographic tools in a
public blockchain environment to efficiently realize users
searching and flexibly add/revoke users is a challenging
problem and we leave it to our future work.
6 DECENTRALIZED SSE IN PRIVATE BLOCKCHAIN
To expand the application scenarios, we construct Π+ with
the private blockchain, where a set of known and identified
service providers (i.e., peer nodes) is available. Although
bearing a stronger assumption for the blockchain network,
Π+ enjoys a higher efficiency than Π.
6.1 The Practical Concerns
The private blockchain, such as Hyperledger, runs among a
set of participants who do not trust each other but have a
common goal and try to provide a service collaboratively.
We emphasize that the assumption of such consortium
holds in practice. Taking health information sharing for ex-
ample, a number of hospitals, research institutes, banks, and
insurance companies may facilitate collaboration to main-
tain a shared medical database so as to provide a better user
experience for patients. Typical examples include World-
Care [29], OMAHA [30], etc. Building a private blockchain
among these participants creates a transparent and reliable
environment for medical data. Clinics or patient individuals
can outsource their medical records, in encrypted versions,
to the consortium for ease of management. When neces-
sary, any participant from the consortium, after getting
authorized by the data owner, can decrypt database locally
and obtain correct medical information with assurance. In
such application scenario, the participants in the consortium
enjoy the benefit of a trusted database when getting access
to. Search services with privacy preserved should also be
supported by the consortium before the data owner releases
private information to all the participants.
6.2 Our Construction
Although using different blockchain platforms with Π, we
can regard blockchain as a black box and construct Π+ simi-
larly. Π+ is constructed based on inverted index framework
as well. The difference lies in the way we deal with the large
data set.
In the Setup, Π+ also divides EDB into n blocks. In
Hyperledger fabric, however, there is a size limitation of the
parameters. Generally speaking, we have n = |EDB|∆fabric , where
∆fabric denotes the limitation for parameter size. According
to our experiments, we can include as many as 500 entries
of L in one transaction, which is much more than that in Π.
In the Search step, since there is no gas limitation
in private blockchain, we can query records as many as
possible. Therefore Π+ sets no limitation for step and set
R = 1. In other words, the search token ST is sent to the
smart contract in one transaction, and the smart contract can
execute search operation at a time.
Π+ supports update operations over a large-scale data
set. Similar to the construction in Fig. 2, Π+ makes use of
different secret keys to realize add or delete, i.e., using KA
andKD to generate add token and delete token respectively.
Besides, it is able to deal with large data set by using
divide-and-conquer method, as did in the Setup phase. Our
experiments will show that Π+ supports adding several
hundreds of files.
6.3 Multi-user Setting
Different from public blockchain environment, only au-
thenticated participants are allowed to join in the private
blockchain network. In light of this, we propose making
use of broadcast encryption [31] to facilitate multi-user data
sharing for Π+. A broadcast encryption system consists of
three randomized algorithms (Init,Enc,Dec). Init(n) takes
as input the number of users and outputs a public key pk
and n secret keys {sk1, sk2, . . . , skn}. Enc takes as input
a subset S and a public key, and outputs the broadcast
ciphertext Hdr. Dec takes as input a subset S, a user id
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, public key pk, the private key ski for
user i, and a broadcast ciphertext. It outputs the plaintext
if i ∈ S. Our multi-user construction is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Compared with the single-user scheme, the contract only
needs to perform some extra simple operations (i.e., xor) in
order to determine if the user has been revoked. It is very
efficient in practice. Our multi-user design requires that the
peers executing smart contracts maintain a private key δ.
Such requirement is easy to realize since every participant in
the private blockchain is identified and permitted by others
to join the consortium. They are motivated to maintain their
reputation and not likely to take the risk of colluding with
users and revealing the secret key.
7 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
7.1 Comparison Between Our Two Designs
Our two proposed decentralized schemes make use of two
different kinds of blockchains, leading to a trade-off be-
8Setup(n, λ):
1) The data owner runs (pk, {sk1, sk2, . . . , skn})← Init(n, λ), and generates a secret key δ ← {0, 1}λ.
2) The data owner constructs a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and performs broadcast encryption Hdr← EncS,pk(δ).
3) Sends (δ,Hdr) to the smart contract, and (pk, ski) to user i.
RevokeUser(i, R, S):
1) The data owner generates a new secret key δ′ ← {0, 1}λ, and sets S′ ← S\R⋃{i}, Hdr′ ← EncS′,pk(δ′).
2) Sends (δ′,Hdr′) to the smart contract, which overwrites the old values of (δ,Hdr), respectively.
AddUser(i):
1) The data owner allocates an identity to user i, and sends (pk, ski) to it.
Trapdoor(ST, i, pk, ski):
1) User i downloads S and Hdr from the blockchain, and computes δ˜ ← DecS,i,pk,ski(Hdr).
2) With search token ST , user i computes S˜T ← ST ⊕ δ˜, and sends S˜T to the smart contract.
Search(S˜T , δ):
1) The smart contract computes St ← S˜T ⊕ δ. If ST is a valid search token, then executes Search(ST ) and outputs the
result, otherwise returns ⊥.
Fig. 5: Multi-user SSE construction in private blockchain.
Scheme Consensus Algorithm Mining Scalability Efficiency Performance Bottleneck Privacy Guarantee Trustworthy
Π PoW Yes High Low Mining Process Yes High
Π+ PBFT No Low High Database Size Yes Low
TABLE 2: A comparison between our two designs
tween security and efficiency. Π is constructed over public
blockchain which already provides a decentralized comput-
ing platform. It enjoys a high scalability since everyone can
freely access to the public platform and build their own SSE
applications. However, its consensus is guaranteed through
costly PoW-based mining process, which becomes the main
performance bottleneck for Π. Specifically, for each trans-
action that triggers search or update function, only after
the transaction gets included into the valid block should
we have confidence in the correctness of search results.
Currently it takes about 17s to mine a block in Ethereum,
which means that we have to wait 17s until we could get
the search results. A detailed explanation is presented in
Section 10.
On the other hand, Π+ requires a stronger security
assumption of a consortium, which has limited application
scenarios. Unlike public blockchain that trusts the whole
world, Π+ believes that the entire consortium is trusted
and always generates correct data. Due to the high effi-
ciency of private blockchain resulting from the fast con-
sensus algorithm (e.g., PBFT), its performance is mainly
affected by the database size, as shown in our experiments
in Section 10.2. The time complexity of Π+ is O(dw) for
a search and O(|Wid|) for an update. Table 2 presents a
concise comparison between them. We emphasize that Π
has a higher trustworthy degree than Π+ since the public
blockchain relies on the assumption that the majority of
the whole world are honest, while the private blockchain
assumes the majority of the involved participants to be
honest. We believe that corrupting more users (i.e., 50% of
the whole world vs. 50% of a set of participants) is much
more difficult, since it needs to unite more network nodes
for the collusion purpose.
7.2 Security Analysis
Soundness: It is straightforward to see that soundness can
be achieved as long as the security of blockchain is guaran-
teed. This is because if smart contracts are correctly executed
on blockchains, the search results will be stored as contract
states permanently. Each node in the blockchain network
can verify the states. The consensus property of blockchain
ensures the correct execution of each search operation.
Confidentiality: Since Π and Π+ have similar system
model and desgin goal (i.e., protecting database from ad-
versary), we will only present a security proof sketch for
Π and the security of Π+ can be proved similarly. To prove
confidentiality, we first proceed with the formal definition of
three stateful leakage functions L = (L1, L2, L3) considered
in our construction. Amongst the state, a list Q recording
all queries that have been submitted will be maintained.
Specifically, each entry of the list Q is of the form (i, op, . . .),
where i denotes a counter, op denotes the operation type,
and the rest denote the inputs to the operation.
• (Leakage function L1). Given an initial input DB,
L1(DB) =
∑
w∈Wd |DB(w)|p e. Meanwhile, it initializes a
counter i = 0, an empty list Q, a set ID containing all
the identifiers in DB, and saves them as the state.
• (Leakage function L2). Given a search input w, L2(in) =
{sp(w,Q),DB(w),AP(w,Q, ID),DP(w,Q, ID)}, where
sp(w,Q) denotes the search pattern, AP(w,Q, ID) (resp.
DP(w,Q, ID)) denotes the add (resp. deletion) pattern
9of the keyword w with respect to Q and ID, all of
which are defined below. Meanwhile, it increases i and
appends (i, search, w) to Q.
• (Leakage function L3). Given an add update input
(id,Wid), L3(in) = {add, |Wid|, (sp(w,Q), ap(id, w,Q),
dp(id, w,Q)) : w ∈ Wid}, where ap(id, w,Q) (resp.
dp(id, w,Q)) denotes the add (resp. deletion) pattern of
id, w with respect toQ, both of which are defined below.
Meanwhile, it increases i, appends (i, add, id,Wid) to Q
and adds id to ID. For a delete update input, the only
difference is that L3(in) outputs del instead of add as
the first component. Finally, if any of the search patterns
was non-empty, then it also outputs id.
Here, we define all the patterns mentioned above. The
search pattern sp(w,Q) is a set of indices of queries where
w was searched for, i.e., sp(w,Q) = {j : (j, srch, w) ∈ Q}.
Namely, the search pattern reveals whether the keyword w
has been searched before. The add pattern ap(id, w,Q) is
the set of indices where w was added to the document id,
i.e., ap(id, w,Q) = {j : (j, add, id,Wid) ∈ Q,w ∈ Wid}.
The add pattern AP(w,Q, ID) is the set of identifiers to
which w was added along with the indices showing when
they were added, i.e., AP(w,Q, ID) = {(id, ap(id, w,Q)) :
id ∈ ID, ap(id, w,Q) 6= ∅}. Besides, the deletion patterns
dp(id, w,Q) and DP(w,Q, ID) can be defined analogously.
Theorem: If G and F are pseudo-random, then our
scheme Π is L-secure against non-adaptive attacks.
Proof is deferred to Appendix A for ease of exposition.
8 CONSTRUCTION VARIANTS
8.1 Adaptive Security
Π is proved to be secure against non-adaptive attacks. As
is noted in [2], making use of random oracle enables us
to achieve adaptive security easily. Specifically, in Π we
replace the PRF F with the random oracle H . For an
input m ∈ {0, 1}λ with key K , F (K,m) is replaced with
H(K||m). And GK(r) is replaced with H(K||r) where r is
randomly chosen from {0, 1}λ. This variant has the same
leakage function with Π. In the security proof, the simulator
S also behaves similarly except that S needs to program
the response of the random oracle in a way that it matches
the query results that are already revealed. For the label l,
S can set the response of H(K||m) to be a random value
with λ bits in length. For the ciphertexts of id, S can set the
random oracle such that the ciphertexts will be decrypted to
the revealed results.
8.2 Forward Privacy
Forward privacy is also an important security design goal
in SSE. It means that the adversary does not learn if the
newly-added document contains a keyword that has been
searched before. Inspired by recent progress [5], our designs
can be easily extended to achieve forward privacy as well.
The key idea is to use trapdoor permutation to make the
search token unlinkable to the update token. Specifically,
when generating a label for the c-th entry in DB(w), instead
of using a counter c that increases itself, we use a trapdoor
permutation pi in a way that βc = pi−1sk (βc−1) and set the
label as l = F (K,βc) where β0 is a randomly chosen
integer. Then on the smart contract, it can only compute
βc−1 = pipk(βc) with the public key in polynomial time, but
not βc+1 since it has no secret key. Therefore, the (c + 1)-th
newly-added entry to DB(w) without having been searched
cannot be deduced from previously-leaked search token
βc. This variant has the same communication complexity
with Π (or Π+), and the computation overheads on the
data owner and the contract increase a little caused by
permutation computation.
8.3 Stateless Data Owner
Currently our schemes require the data owner to maintain a
local dictionary σ consisting of a counter for each keyword
that is added after initialization. We could slightly modify
the Add protocol to make the data owner stateless by en-
crypting σ and sending the ciphertexts to any decentralized
file storage systems (e.g., IPFS). The data owner can fetch
the encrypted σ and decrypt it for each Add operation. The
size of σ relies on the number of distinct keywords that have
been added in the Add phase, which is much smaller than
the total number of keywords. In this case, the adversary
can learn how many of new keywords were added into the
database. This leaked information is acceptable in practice
as far as we can see.
8.4 Security Against Malicious Data Owner
In the multi-user setting, Π is vulnerable to a malicious data
owner who arbitrarily reveals a random search token. To
mitigate such attack, we can use zero-knowledge proof [32]
to force the data owner to reveal a correct search token.
Specifically, we first let the data owner generate a proof for
his search token by using zero-knowledge proof. Then we
use smart contract to verify the proof, as did in [33]. If the
search token is invalid we stop searching. In this way, the
data owner earns nothing with the cheating.
9 GENERALIZATION OF OUR FRAMEWORK
In this work, we use smart contract to construct a decentral-
ized SSE scheme based on the inverted index. We remark
that many other SSE schemes fit for our framework as well
and can be extended to construct abundant decentralized
SSE schemes with soundness guaranteed.
Recent works on SSE have focused on increasing their
expressiveness such as supporting boolean queries [11],
[16], [17], or developing structured encryption like graph
encryption [18], [22]. All of them are also bothered with
a serious security challenge: a malicious central server can
output partial or even incorrect results whenever it wants.
To address this concern, these works can be tuned into
our decentralized setting likewise. The most intuitive ob-
servation of this extension is that smart contracts actually
provide us with a trusted and transparent “server”. The
main obstacle lies in dealing with various limitations of
gas system in smart contract when using public blockchain.
Our proposed several countermeasures (e.g., dividing the
encrypted index and conquering them individually, packing
multiple identifiers) throw light on how to address these
issues. Once constructed via smart contracts, the scheme is
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DB name (ω, id) pairs distinct keywords EDB
DB1 100, 763 22, 673 5.4MB
DB2 300, 617 54, 980 14.1MB
DB3 500, 567 75, 924 21.3MB
DB4 1, 000, 141 123, 912 39MB
TABLE 3: Evaluation database sizes.
guaranteed with soundness and thus there is no need to
concern itself with a malicious server any more.
Storing data and executing computations in blockchain-
based decentralized environments are reliable and im-
mutable. We strongly believe that using decentralized plat-
forms instead of a central server benefits a lot for the
security requirements of SSE.
10 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUTATIONS
We implement prototypes for both Π and Π+. We first eval-
uate Π and Π+ in local simulated blockchain networks with
TestRPC and Hyperledger fabric, respectively. Besides, the
multi-user design of Π+ is evaluated as well to demonstrate
the performance of adding/revoking users. Considering the
open property of public blockchain, we further deploy Π to
an official Ethereum test network Rinkeby.
10.1 Implementation Details
The data owner is instantiated on a local machine with
16GB of RAM, 4 Intel cores i7-3770, running Ubuntu 16.04.2.
For Π, we deploy the smart contract to a local simulated
network TestRPC and also an official Ethereum test network
Rinkeby, respectively. The data owner side is written in
Python and the smart contract is implemented in Solidity in
combination with Javascript as the intermediate interactive
language. We implement PRF and random oracles using
HMAC-SHA256. Since Ethereum currently does not support
HMAC instantiation, we follow the standard construction of
HMAC [25] and implement HMAC-SHA256 using Python
and Solidity, respectively. To avoid exceeding gasLimit, in
the setup phase the encrypted database EDB is divided into
n subsets and sent to the smart contract with n transactions.
Due to the time-varying nature of gasLimit, we experimen-
tally include 70 entries from the list L in each transaction and
set the pack number to be p = 8. In addition, each search
query is also completed with R transactions at most, each of
them returns step = 47 items at most. In our experiments,
R = 4 satisfies our requirements.
For Π+, we use the Hyperledger fabric framework to
construct a local private blockchain, and the smart contract
(also named chaincode in Hyperledger) is written in Go
language. There are two peers in our test network belonging
to different organizations and we use the default 256-bit
ECDSA scheme for signature purpose. We also use built-in
HMAC-SHA256 function library supported by Go language.
Due to the high scalability of private blockchain, we set
p = 10 and include 500 entries from the list L in each
transaction. One transaction is sufficient to complete search
query and thus we set R = 1 and no limitation for step.
The experiments reported in this work use datasets
derived from Enron emails2, which are a collection of plain
2. https://www.cs.cmu.edu/.˜/enron.
text files. We extract a subset of emails and select increasing
subsets from the original subset as document collections
with different numbers of (w, id) (i.e., keyword/identifier)
pairs. The key attributes of these datasets are summarised
in Table 3.
10.2 Experiments on Simulated Network
We first evaluate Π and Π+ on local simulated networks. We
use TestRPC3 to construct a simulated Ethereum network,
and Fabric version v1.3.0 4 for a local Hyperledger network.
TestRPC is initialized with the default configuration, which
is much like real Ethereum environment except that its block
time for mining is set to be 0. This allows us to focus on
the performance of SSE part on smart contract, irrespective
of time-consuming mining process and complex network
circumstances (e.g., broadcast latency, transaction mining
delay) in Ethereum.
Table 4 presents an overview of time costs for each phase
over different datasets. In the setup phase, different from
existing centralized SSE schemes where the data owner side
dominates the efficiency, the time cost on smart contract is
much higher than that on the data owner. This is because
storing EDB in Π is completed with thousands of transac-
tions, with each transaction costing 4 seconds on average,
while Π+ needs about hundreds of transactions. We also
observe that Π+ has a much higher efficiency in each
step than Π. This again shows that the private blockchain
leverages a faster consensus algorithm (e.g., PBFT vs. PoW),
such that Π+ inevitably enjoys a higher efficiency than Π
although they have the same structure of encrypted index.
To show the core algorithm, Fig. 6(a) presents the search
time per found document varying with the number of
matching records. Due to the high efficiency of Π+, we only
evaluate it with the largest dataset DB4. We report average
run times over 30 trials. For Π, the first thing we can notice
is that a larger result set yields a lower search overhead
(on a per matching document basis). We explain that by
the constant cost of loading past mined blocks from disk
into memory before each search runs. This also explains our
second observation: the larger the dataset, the slower the
search algorithm is. A larger number of mined blocks leads
to a longer time for loading. For Π+, we not only see that
it has a lower time cost than Π, but also conclude that the
number of matching document has negligible impact on the
search overhead.
Fig. 6(b) shows the update performance for Π+ by
varying the number of added files. Each added file includes
100 keyword/identifier pairs. We can see that adding about
2,200 files costs less than half an hour. Π is not presented
since we give a high-throughput experiment (e.g., adding
hundreds of files) which is apparently not suitable for Π.
The update experiments for Π over a small dataset is shown
in Fig. 8(b).
To evaluate the performance of multi-user setting, Ta-
ble 5 presents the time costs of each algorithm described
in Fig. 5. We select the number of users in a large range
to clearly demonstrate the efficiency. For the search pro-
cess, we only present the additional time cost caused
3. https://github.com/ethereumjs/testrpc.
4. https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-releases
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DB Setup Search UpdateD.O. time Π Π+ D.O. time Π Π+ D.O. time Π Π+
DB1 9s 23min 2min ≈ 1ms 7s 0.3s ≈ 1ms 10s 0.4s
DB2 15s 66min 6min ≈ 1ms 8s 0.5s ≈ 1ms 10s 0.4s
DB3 18s 114min 9min ≈ 1ms 10s 0.6s ≈ 1ms 10s 0.4s
DB4 23S 949min 15min ≈ 1ms 16s 0.8s ≈ 1ms 10s 0.4s
TABLE 4: Evaluations for Π and Π+ in local simulated network. Here D.O. represents the time costs on the ‘Data Owner’.
Search time is evaluated by returning 100 matched documents. Update overheads are given by adding and deleting a file,
the size of which is chosen to incur only one transaction.
TABLE 5: Efficiency evaluations for the multi-user setting
Number Setup RevokeUser AddUser Trapdoor Searchof users
8 0.21s 0.19s ≈ 1ms 9.5ms ≈ 1ms
64 1.06s 0.92s ≈ 1ms 9.6ms ≈ 1ms
512 7.76s 7.70s ≈ 1ms 9.1ms ≈ 1ms
4096 63.32s 63.26s ≈ 1ms 9.7ms ≈ 1ms
32768 497.43s 496.29s ≈ 1ms 9.3ms ≈ 1ms
(a) Search time per matching doc-
ument in Π and Π+.
(b) Update time vs. the number of
added files in Π+.
Fig. 6: Efficiency evaluations for Π and Π+.
by Search(S˜T , δ), without including the time cost of
Search(ST ). We can see that the time costs of Setup and
RevokeUser increase with the number of users, and they
have similar overheads. This is because revoking users in
Π+ needs to generate new secret keys and renewedly per-
form broadcast encryption in the same way with the setup.
On the contrary, the other operations incur negligible time
costs. Compared with the frequently executed searching,
revoking users can be regarded as an one-time operation.
Therefore, we emphasize that our multi-user design is still
practical in real-world applications.
10.3 Experiments on Official Test Network
To show the practicability of decentralized SSE scheme, we
deploy Π to the official Ethereum test network Rinkeby5 that
mimics the real production network. Due to the limited bal-
ance, we only conduct experiments on the smallest database
DB1. Our account and contract addresses in Rinkeby are
• 0x7aef688b95a1bee573d464766b3a6c0470b9b57b.
• 0xecE97a98Da7f5DBECcb81E772dD04710e676Aa96.
To illustrate the impact of mining process on the efficiency,
we record the block number of each transaction generated in
5. https://www.rinkeby.io/
Fig. 7: Setup: Gas usage of each mined block in Rinkeby.
(a) Search time vs. the number of
matching documents
(b) Update time vs. the number of
transactions.
Fig. 8: Efficiency evaluations for Π in Rinkeby.
our setup phase and the corresponding gas usage, as shown
in Fig. 7. In summary, it consists of 350 transactions, each of
which is mined into one block with block number ranging
from 176, 837 to 177, 187. The average block time for mining
is 15s, resulting in 88min to complete the entire setup phase.
This again explains why the time cost of setup is dominated
by the smart contract, instead of the data owner like in
existing centralized SSE schemes. Besides, the average gas
usage for a transaction is 4, 201, 232. Currently 1 gas costs
about 1.8×10−8 Ether, at the exchange rate of 89 USD at the
time of writing. So each transaction costs about 0.076 Ether
(or 6.7 USD).
Fig. 8(a) shows the total time needed to perform a search,
given a search token (we neglect the cost of generating a
search token since it is a small constant in microseconds).
Each point is the mean of 10 executions. It clearly demon-
strates the performance bottleneck of decentralized SSE. To
be specific, we can see that the search time grows with
the increase of the number of matching documents. But the
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sharp growth lies in the increase of the transaction number
needed to complete the search step. It indicates that the time
cost of mining each transaction dominates the overhead
of each search. On the contrary, search algorithm has a
faint impact on the efficiency. Generally speaking, the time
cost of the mining process is dynamically adjustable. When
the blockchain environment scales to allow a higher gas
limitation or a faster mining process, our search efficiency
increases as well.
A similar situation occurs in Fig. 8(b) which describes
time costs varying with the number of transactions needed
to add/delete a file. By choosing different sizes of files, we
have update completed with different numbers of trans-
actions. It again shows that the mining process of each
transaction is the dominant factor on the efficiency.
11 FUTURE WORK
11.1 Hardening Security with Trusted Processor
Trusted processor is one of emerging security technologies
that protects the private information through hardware-
assisted trusted execution environment. It can protect the
integrity and confidentiality of private data from other
applications and privileged system software such as the
operating system, hypervisor, and firmware, and has been
widely used to provide privacy guarantee for various jobs,
like Tor network [34] or system log processing [35], etc.
Although Π+ and Π are designed to secure the private data,
some information leakage still exists such as the search pat-
tern and access pattern. In light of this, integrating trusted
processor with blockchain is a promising approach to ad-
dress this issue. Prior works have explored the potential of
applying trusted processors to the encrypted search [36],
[37], [38], but how to support blockchain-based decentral-
ized encrypted search is still a challenging problem.
11.2 Improving Efficiency with Sharding
Sharding is an important technique to improve the effi-
ciency and scalability of blockchain networks. It generally
partitions a large blockchain network into separate subsets
(i.e., shards), each of which deals with a disjoint set of
transactions and runs an intra consensus protocol indepen-
dently [39], [40]. It is obvious that building our schemes of
Π and Π+ atop of sharded blockchains benefits a lot for
improving efficiency. Besides, a tailor-made search index is
desired that caters to the sharded structure of blockchain.
Parallel execution of search operations among shards can
also improve efficiency greatly. However, how to design
such a customized encrypted search index still remains
unclear.
12 CONCLUSION
Traditional searchable symmetric encryption relies on a
central server to manipulate search jobs. In this work, we
resort to public and private blockchain technologies and
construct two decentralized SSE schemes aiming at address-
ing malicious adversary. Different from existing verifiable
SSE schemes, our search results are correct and immutable,
and no verifications are needed on the data owner side.
Our framework can be applied to other SSE schemes with
complex queries. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments
in both locally simulated and official test networks to
demonstrate the practicability of decentralized SSE schemes.
APPENDIX
CONFIDENTIALITY PROOF
We first restate the security claim for Π. Theorem: If G and
F are pseudo-random, define L = (L1, L2, L3), then our
scheme Π is L-secure against non-adaptive attacks.
Proof Sketch: We describe a polynomial-time simulator S
such that for any PPT adversaryA, the outputs ofRealΠA(λ)
and IdealΠA,S(λ) are computationally indistinguishable.
To prove non-adaptive security, the simulator S must
be given all the leakages before simulating the view of the
adversary, which includes the encrypted database (γ, γA
and IDdel) and the messages sent by the data owner.
The simulator iterates over the queries, it chooses the
keys K˜1, K˜2, K˜A1 , K˜
A
2 , K˜
D
1 for each search at random with
repetitions specified by the search pattern. Then it simulates
the initial EDB as follows. For all file id’s associated with
each search keyword w (i.e., id ∈ DB(w)), S computes l, d
and r as specified in the real Setup (using K˜1 and K˜2 as
K1 and K2), adds each pair (l, d, r) to a list L, and then
adds random pairs to L (still maintained in lexicographic
order) until it has
∑
w∈Wd |DB(w)|p e total elements, and finally
creates a dictionary γ˜. The simulator outputs the simulated
γ˜ and the simulated transcript (K˜1, K˜2, K˜A1 , K˜
A
2 , K˜
D
1 ) for
each search query. Note that c and step are public system
parameters and deterministically computable from the state
information, which do not need to be simulated.
Next, to simulate add update queries, that is, the simula-
tor S needs to simulate the message sent by the client, which
contains multiple label/data/randomness/iddel tuples. The
simulator S must determine whether each tuple sent is
generated at random or should be computed with one of the
keys used for a search query transcript. Intuitively, this can
be done by leveraging both the add pattern AP(w,Q, ID)
and ap(id, w,Q) leakages which include the id to encrypt
when the add updates contain a keyword that was pre-
viously searched. The simulator can further simulate γ˜A
based on all the messages sent by the client and the delete
patterns. Note that the message sent back to the client is
deterministically computable from the state information,
which does not need to be simulated.
To simulate delete update queries, the simulator S needs
to simulate the message sent by the client like add. Thus
by using the deletion patterns DP(w,Q, ID) and dp(id, w,Q)
leakages, the simulator can simulate the corresponding mes-
sage in a similar way. Finally, the simulator can simulate
I˜Ddel based on all the messages sent by the client and the
add patterns.
In summary, the theorem follows from the pseudo-
randomness of F and G. 
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